The Human Genome Project and ELSI: The Imperative of Technology and the Reduction of the Public Ethics Debate by Carvalho, Tito Brige (Author) et al.
The Human Genome Project and ELSI  
The Imperative of Technology and the Reduction of the Public Ethics Debate  
by 
Tito Carvalho 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Science  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2012 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Jason Robert, Chair 
James Hurlbut 
Karin Ellison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2012  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
In the past century, a number of technological projects have been 
undertaken as grand solutions to social problems. In the so called century of 
biology, this technological world view focuses on biomedical advances. The 
President of the United States, who once called for nuclear weapons and space 
exploration, now calls for new biotechnologies, such as genomics, individualized 
medicine, and nanotechnology, which will improve the world by improving our 
biological lives.  
Portrayed as the Manhattan Project of the late 20th Century, the Human 
Genome Project (HGP) not only undertook the science of sequencing the human 
genome but also the ethics of it. For this thesis I ask how the HGP did this; what 
was the range of possibilities of goods and evils imagined by the HGP; and what, 
if anything, was left out. I show that the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications 
(ELSI) research program of the HGP was inscribed with the competencies of the 
professional field of bioethics, which had lent itself useful for governing 
biomedical science and technology earlier in the 20th century.  
Drawing on a sociological framework for understanding the development 
of professional bioethics, I describe the development of ELSI, and I note how the 
given-in-advance boundaries between authorized/unauthorized questions shaped 
its formation and biased technologically based conceptualizations of social 
problems and potential solutions. In this sense, the HGP and ELSI served both as 
the ends of policy and as instruments of self-legitimation, thus re-inscribing and 
enacting the structures for these powerful sociotechnical imaginaries.  
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I engage the HGP and ELSI through historical, sociological, and political 
philosophical analysis, by examining their immediate context of the NIH, the 
meso level of professional/disciplinary bioethics, and the larger context of 
American democracy and modernity. My argument is simultaneously a claim 
about how questions are asked and how knowledge and expertise are made, 
exposing the relationship between the HGP and ELSI as a mutually constitutive 
and reciprocally related form of coproduction of knowledge and social structures. 
I finish by arguing that ELSI is in a better position than bioethics to carry 
out the original project of that field, i.e., to provide a space to elucidate certain 
institutionally authorized questions about science and technology. Finally, I 
venture into making a prophecy about the future of ELSI and bioethics: that the 
former will replace the latter as a locus for only formally rational and thin ethical 
debates. 
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Introduction 
In the past century, a number of technological projects have been 
undertaken as grand solutions to social problems. The stories are all too familiar. 
Conflicting political ideologies that could result in a full scale world war were 
kept in check by the development of the atomic bomb, sparing the world of the 
same fate of the first and second wars. Space exploration was another frontier of 
technological advance rationalized in terms of social progress. Somehow looking 
up to the skies was supposed to teach us something about things down here in the 
world.  
These stories are embedded in our imaginations in a number of ways. In 
the realms of art and fiction, perhaps most famously, Stanley Kubrick’s 
masterpieces share a common theme: man designs machinery that functions with 
perfect logic to bring about a disastrous outcome. But things are more subtle in 
real life. The year 2001 has come and gone, and there is no super computer like 
Hal 9000. There is no literal doomsday machine either. For that matter, there has 
not been annihilation of the earth, evidently. But this does not mean that 
Kubrick’s imaginations are simply fictional. As a caricature which accentuates 
real life’s features, Kubrick’s films highlight real though subtle technologically 
centered social processes. 
The bad news is that the subtlety of reality is more treacherous than the 
explicit dangers of fictional scenarios. After all, Dr. Dave Bowman could always 
look over his shoulder to make sure that Hal was not behind him. To escape from 
Hal, Bowman simply had to find the master controls of the spaceship and push the 
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“off” button of the computer. I could go on to describe how one ought to deal 
with the Soviets’ doomsday machine in Dr. Strangelove, but I think one gets the 
picture. In reality, though, it is not clear what one ought to do. The imperative of 
technology is not reduced to a machine located in a building or in some other 
physical space. The imperative of technology is located in the collective 
imagination, and in the systems of abstract knowledge employed by our 
institutions of power and governance. It is as much about making the world in 
which we live in as it is a product of the world. As Michel Foucault points out: 
like it or not, we are a part of it. There is no looking over one’s shoulder.    
It is also not clear if this technological imperative is good or bad, or in 
between –only complicating things a bit more. As it turns out, it is often the case 
that science and technology actually get things done. Countless are the devices, 
treatments, and bits of knowledge that improve, if not save, human lives. Yet, the 
world is in many ways still a place full of suffering and violence (broadly 
understood). And it is not obvious, though some disagree, that things are better in 
the age of science and technology than they have been before. However, 
regardless of how things compare with the past, it is clear indeed that the world is 
not a perfect place. In the age of modernity, science and technology, why is that? 
One way to think about this question is quantitatively, positivistically, and 
optimistically. Give science and technology more time, more science, and more 
technology, and we will get there.  
The approach mentioned above misses the opportunity to ask more 
fundamental questions about the nature of the problem – which might just be 
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related to a technological world view – and how to frame it. A more fundamental 
critique ought to point out that how we ask such questions (e.g., “is tech good or 
bad?”) matters. What goods and evils are imaginable within a technological 
imperative? How do we think of goods and evils in the space of technological 
imaginations? And, in the case of this thesis, how are the Human Genome Project 
(HGP) and ELSI noteworthy expressions of such imaginations?   
Since the Manhattan Project, the United States has invested more in 
research and technology than any other country in history. In the so called century 
of biology, the technological world view has focused on biomedical advances. 
The most challenging problems are now the important problems of human health 
and wellbeing. The Manhattan Project of the late 20th Century was the HGP1
Focusing on the HGP’s experience with the Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications (ELSI) research program of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), I 
will argue that by reducing social and ethical concerns to narrowly defined 
downstream problems of technological endeavors, such as in the case of ELSI, the 
technocratic framework to understand and address social problems attempts to 
remain unchallenged. Furthermore, I will point to how this framework is a self-
perpetuating world making enterprise with roots directly traced back to the 
. The 
President of the United States, who once called for nuclear weapons and space 
exploration, now calls for new biotechnologies, such as genomics, individualized 
medicine, and nanotechnology, which will improve the world by improving our 
biological lives. Most strikingly, ethics became bioethics. 
                                                 
1 The HGP was the outcome efforts to study DNA changes of atomic bomb survivors. 
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recombinant DNA technology controversies of the 1970’s; additionally, this 
framework is connected in both directions to a more subtle underlying social 
process of the thinning of social debates on the ultimate goods for society –a 
process pointed out and lamented by such thinkers as Max Weber and Jürgen 
Habermas. 
Just like its physical science counterparts, the HGP’s promises were of 
revolutionary caliber. After the completion of the HGP, its proponents argued, 
medicine would be completely revitalized as the path for individualized health 
care and tailored life plans would be paved, and a great number of human diseases 
would be treated at their root causes: the genes. In some ways, the HGP has been 
fairly well documented. The physician Robert Cook-Deegan, for example, 
provides an accurate account of the history behind the HGP in the acclaimed book 
The Gene Wars. Special issues of Science and Nature have been dedicated to 
reviewing and reflecting on the HGP, usually marking important landmarks, such 
as the completion of the human genome in 2001, and the ten year anniversary of 
this accomplishment in 2011.  
However, as I alluded to above, another important dimension of projects 
like the HGP has to do with how they relate with the ways in which modern, 
technocentric societies perceive and address complicated social and ethical 
problems. As I will argue, the HGP, through ELSI, not independently of a socio-
cultural context, helped pave the way for imaginations of social problems and 
solutions as technological imperatives. In this sense, the HGP and ELSI served 
both as the ends of policy and as an instrument of self-legitimation; while these 
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powerful sociotechnical imaginaries (i.e., collective visions of good and attainable 
futures produced by science and technology) carry tacit, though rich prior 
normative commitments as the ends of the policies that enacted the HGP, social 
and ethical considerations were, on the other hand, reduced to a set of narrowly 
defined downstream problems, legitimizing the HGP through ELSI. 
As the ELSI program evidences, one way that scientists, policymakers, 
and bioethicists, imagine and address social and ethical considerations relating to 
grand technological projects is by incorporating a social and ethical research 
component to address the downstream implications of the technology. Though a 
number of important studies have brought to the surface the tacit ways in which 
genomic paradigms of scientific and social research describe and characterize the 
self and society2
Drawing on the sociological framework for understanding the history of 
bioethics developed by John Evans
, in the following pages I examine ELSI – both as a research 
component of the HGP, as well as a concept of a research category, or quasi field 
of inquiry in science and technology – as a productive and important case for 
understanding the forces that re-inscribe and enact the structures for these 
powerful sociotechnical imaginaries. 
3
                                                 
2 See, for example, Jenny Reardon’s Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance in the Age of 
Genomics. 
, I describe the development of ELSI as a 
research community, and I note how the given-in-advance boundaries between 
authorized/unauthorized questions – which derive from the institutional position 
of ELSI within HGP – shaped the formation of this community.  In other words, 
3 John Evans explores the social forces that have shaped bioethics in his book Playing God? 
Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of the Public Bioethical Debate. 
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HGP ELSI is an institutional space for articulating and inscribing the questions 
and the community that could answer them, and these question framings persisted 
beyond the HGP because they were built into the competencies for the community 
it produced.  Thus the preoccupations and discourses that were made off limits to 
critique the HGP (specifically as a genome research program, and more broadly 
as a technological solution to not necessarily technological problems) remain so 
because they were boxed out of ELSI as a research community.  
With this in mind, I engage the HGP and ELSI through historical, 
sociological, and political philosophical analysis, by examining them in their 
immediate context of the NIH, the meso level of professional/disciplinary 
bioethics, and the larger context of American liberal democracy and modernity. 
While the questions addressed here are about the development of ELSI from a 
specific research program into a quasi field of inquiry in science and technology, 
the answers illuminate the ways in which technocentric societies understand and 
address social and ethical problems. 
  In my view, the ELSI program of the HGP helped establish a framework 
of genomic research and developed techniques for imagining particular kinds of 
futures  within this framework, by defining the problems, principles and 
discourses within genomic research. Furthermore, and most importantly, the very 
ways in which ELSI is set up as a system of governance furthers the thinning of 
ethical debates on scientific research – providing a pathway for the original 
project of bioethics – while, at the same time, necessarily carrying tacitly 
inscribed imaginations of social problems and solutions. In this way ELSI 
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transcends the HGP, or any one technological project for that matter, 
simultaneously exposing that in another way social and ethical considerations are 
reduced to being sub-components of technological projects, focused on narrowly 
defined downstream problems. This is simultaneously a claim about how 
questions are asked and how knowledge is made, and a claim about how ELSI 
became a “machine” for “doing” ethical considerations. These modalities of 
ordering the work of ELSI (e.g. through agenda-setting) and of how to think about 
ethics are mutually constitutive and reciprocally related in a form of coproduction 
of knowledge and social structures.   
While I situate ELSI within the larger field of bioethics, using Evans’s 
work as a foundation, I also offer a detailed account of the institutional history of 
ELSI within the NIH and the American scientific community to add an additional 
layer to Evans’s professional jurisdictional analysis. This, I believe, will be 
crucial for making full sense of ELSI as an intellectual, institutional and social 
enterprise, and for understanding its place in the larger field of bioethics, with its 
professional norms, shared views of the ends to be pursued, and prior normative 
commitments.  
Finally, based on the professional jurisdictional forces that shaped 
bioethics to become a locus of formally rational deliberations in the life sciences 
(see section 1 below), combined with ELSI’s administrative shape as a formal 
research program, with accountability structures, gate-keeping, and the obligation 
to produce deliverables, I also argue that ELSI is in a better position than 
bioethics to carry out the original project of that field – i.e., to provide a space to 
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elucidate certain institutionally authorized questions in science and technology. 
With this rationale, and based on the evidence I have identified in the course of 
my research and argument, I will venture into making a prophecy about the future 
of ELSI and bioethics, that ELSI, as a quasi field of inquiry in science and 
technology, will replace bioethics as a locus for formally rational and thin 
debates, while bioethics will become an arena for popular and substantially 
rational debates. 
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1. Formal and substantive rationality and bioethics 
Because my argument relies heavily on the concepts of formal and 
substantive rationality used by Evans in explaining the development of the field of 
bioethics, it is appropriate that I spend some lines elucidating these modes of 
rationality, and how they relate to bioethics. 
Referring to the work of the social theorist Max Weber, Evans explains 
that “a pattern of action is substantively rational if it implies ‘the criteria of 
ultimate ends’ or ‘ultimate values’ [Weberian terms] to acts or means” (Evans, 
2002). Hence, a substantive debate would be on deciding what ultimate ends 
should be pursued, or, when in relation to the possible means to accepted ends, 
whether or not the means are consistent with the ends. In contrast to substantive 
rationality, formal rationality relates to rationality employed in figuring out what 
is the most effective means to a given end. Here the ultimate ends are not 
subjected to debate, and possible means to a previously committed end are 
debated in terms of their effectiveness in leading to that end. Formal rationality is, 
for Weber, an expression of the bureaucratization of reasoning, with rule 
commensuration as the modality for tethering mid-level decision-making to 
predefined rules and norms. This is important for Evans’ assessment of bioethics, 
and its relation to democratic pluralism. 
As Evans points out, the field of bioethics was developed by a shift from 
substantively rational to formally rational social debates relating to science and 
technology. Evans does a lot of heavy lifting work to analyze this changing debate 
in relation to the pursued ends, means, and relationship between means and ends. 
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For now, however, it is enough to know that because of their place in American 
pluralist democracy (i.e., unelected individuals making normative judgments 
about science and technology), bioethicists found formal rationality the most 
appropriate and useful way to address social and ethical problems in science and 
technology. Hence, they adopted the ultimate ends (i.e., the principles of bioethics 
of autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance, and justice) that they argued were 
universal principles they derived from the public. 
With this brief background on formal and substantive rationality, and on 
how they relate to the development of the bioethics profession, we can proceed to 
see how the HGP formed its ELSI program, and how this initially narrowly 
defined program transcended into a larger field of inquiry in science and 
technology. 
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2. Mapping the human genome: A brief history of the HGP and the 
emergence of the ELSI program 
The Human Genome Project (HGP) was an international scientific 
collaboration initiated in 1990.  Its original goals were to analyze the structure of 
human DNA, determine the location of all human genes in the human 
chromosomes, and make the mapped human genome available for further 
specialized studies. Twenty years later, many countries have established human 
genome research programs.  
The conceptual foundations for the HGP surfaced in the U.S. in 1985 
when the Office of Health and Environmental Research (OHER) at the 
Department of Energy (DOE) proposed the Human Genome Initiative – an 
interest that grew out of an effort to study DNA changes of atomic bomb 
survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While there was strong resistance to a 
“mindless sequencing project” in the beginning (Cook-Deegan, 1995), the 
feasibility of the initiative was established through a number of conferences and 
meetings in the following years, and in 1990 the DOE and the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) presented a joint HGP proposal to Congress.  In fact, they 
pledged just the opposite of a mindless sequence of human DNA base pairs; the 
HGP promised nothing less than to revitalize medicine. Through the HGP, its 
proponents argued, the path for individualized medicine and genetically tailored 
life plans would be paved, with a great number of human diseases been treated at 
their root causes: the genes. 
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In that bid, the director of the National Center for Human Genome 
Research (NCHGR)4
Ratified by the United States Senate Subcommittee on Science and Space, 
during its hearings on the HGP in 1989
 of the NIH, the scientist James Watson, proposed ELSI on 
the basis that the promised scientific revolution caused by the HGP would 
precipitate a social revolution, and, with this in mind, the ethical, legal, and social 
implications of the HGP deserved to be paid attention with a special effort, and 
should be funded by the HGP itself (Watson, 2000). In this way, ELSI was a 
program reactive to a possible future, which it actually contributed to 
constructing. ELSI was supposed to help create a future, but one which was 
already constrained by a technologically based imagination, which was out of 
boundaries for ELSI to question.  
5, the rationale for funding ELSI in the 
course of and within the HGP was just that early ethical, social and legal insight 
would predict and prevent – rather than respond post hoc – the ethical, social and 
legal problems that the research, technologies, and treatments coming out of 
mapping the human genome would encounter. ELSI, then, was expected to 
provide policy options to deal with narrowly defined, downstream problems.6
Watson’s initiative to incorporate the ELSI program in the structure of the 
NCHGR can also be read in a more cynical light. It anticipated Congressional 
reservations about the HGP, including pressure for an ethics component to the 
 
                                                 
4 With a growing interest in genomic research, the NCHGR gained status of full institute within 
the NIH in 1997, becoming the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI). 
5 Senate Committee on Commerce S and Transportation. Human Genome Initiative. Hearing T. 
Subcommittee on Science, and Space; 1989. 
6 Wolfe A. Federal policy making for biotechnology, executive branch, ELSI. In: Murray TH, 
Mehlman MJ, editors. Encyclopedia of ethical, legal and policy issues in biotechnology, vol. 1. 
New York: Wiley; 2000. p.234–40. 
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research from then Senator Albert Gore. Watson bluntly advised the DOE that if 
research on ethics was not a part of that department’s genome program, 
“Congress will chop your head off!” (Cook-Deegan, 1995). In fact, Watson 
assumed a Godfather-like stance: “keep your friends close, but keep your enemies 
closer”; that is, if the HGP was going to be the object of ethical, social and legal 
scrutiny, the HGP itself should make efforts to manage that.  But the politics of 
HGP funding, including Watson’s cynicism, are not sufficient to explain the form 
that ELSI ultimately took, let alone why ELSI is important, and why it has 
become a model for incorporating ethical considerations in subsequent techno-
scientific projects. 
The first draft of the human genome was published ahead of schedule, on 
16 February 2001, simultaneously by the NIH and Celera Genomics in the 
journals Nature and Science respectively. Francis Collins, of the National Human 
Genome Research Institute, and Craig Venter, of Celera, appeared alongside 
President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair to announce the 
completion of a preliminary draft of the human genome. Later that year, Venter 
and Collins also discussed their findings at the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science’s annual meeting. One question that was also outside the 
boundaries of ELSI was just how did genomics come to have such a gigantic 
public presence? (Maienschein, 2003). 
The concept of merging ethical deliberation into the research agenda of a 
large technological initiative was not completely new. As the bioethicist John 
Fletcher has pointed out in a brief history of bioethics at the NIH, bioethical 
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commissions have been involved in reviewing and drafting scientific 
investigations in the NIH for a relatively long time when compared to the 
development of the ELSI program (Fletcher, 1995). The earliest example of this 
was the Clinical Research Committee (CRC) which reviewed all studies with 
volunteers as early as 1953. Since the principles that were been used by the CRC, 
as well as the professionals involved in that committee (virtually all physicians 
effectively asking medical questions), were very much different than what 
bioethical bodies use today, the CRC was not the sort of thing that we would 
recognize today as bioethics. Nevertheless, Fletcher points to, in a sense, the 
institutional structure for governing bioethical already taking shape. 
Besides the CRC, the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), 
initiated in 1974, is among the most studied cases of ethics bodies in the NIH. 
This is so in part because it has become a widely used model for incorporation of 
ethical and social concerns in the very research that is meant to come under 
critical view, and it has actually been directly compared with the ELSI program. 
In many ways, like I will explore below, the RAC, including the Asilomar 
meeting of 1975, has important similarities (e.g., anticipatory governance) and 
differences (e.g., regulatory restraints reduced to technical risk assessment) with 
the ELSI program of the HGP. 
Though ELSI was not the first ethics program embedded in its 
correspondent scientific project, it is a special and important case in the history of 
American science governance in many ways. Thus, the question of whether ELSI 
was the first (nominal) ethics program is irrelevant. ELSI is very different from 
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the CRC and the RAC, despite also being an attempt by the NIH to rationally 
contend with ethical questions surrounding medical science and technology. First, 
it is the largest and most well-funded7
Furthermore, the HGP’s ELSI program effectively became a widely used 
model for integrating ethical, social, and legal research into technological 
 research program of its kind. But most 
importantly: second, its structure (see Figure 1 below) is different from the 
previous programs in relevant ways. For example, it involves both intramural and 
extramural research projects, and it includes a wide variety of researchers, 
including from the humanities and social sciences; and third, it addresses 
questions in clinical bioethics, research bioethics, and wider policy issues. The 
other NIH initiatives tend to be intramural programs, smaller in the scope of their 
questions and funding, and they tend to involve mostly scientists. Thus, the 
implementation of the ELSI program represents, in my view, an important 
moment in American science governance. It was a way to respond to a wide range 
of concerns involving a big scientific project. Extramural research involving 
ethical, social, and legal concerns would all come under the umbrella of the NIH. 
The rationalization of the public bioethical debate, i.e., the professionalization of 
bioethics, was not enough. Ethical questions had to be boxed-in more concretely 
than they were in the abstract system of knowledge of the bioethics profession. In 
the following pages I will attempt to explain why. 
                                                 
7 Between 3% and 5% of the total budget of the HGP (roughly US$150 million from 1989 to 
2003) was allocated to ELSI.  
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Fig. 1: The formal structure of ELSI: ELSI program announcements: 
 First Broad ELSI PA (1990) 
 ELSI R01 and R25 PA (1996) 
 ELSI R01, R25 and R03 separate PAs (2000)  
 ELSI R01 and R03 separate PAs (2004 and 2008) 
 No new Education grants (R25) accepted after 7/1/04 
 ELSI R01, R03 and R21 separate PAs (2011) 
Program Announcements solicit investigator initiated research.  The priorities 
outlined in the PAs have been derived from the Institute’s regular strategic planning 
process (see sections 5, 6 & 7 below), which incorporates input from external 
advisors. 
2000 PA was based on goals from 1998 Strategic Plan, “New Goals for the US 
Human Genome Project: 1998-2003,” (Science (1998) 282:682-689). 
2004 and 2008 PAs based on goals from  2003 plan, "A Vision for the Future of 
Genomics Research," (Nature (2003) 422:835-847).  
2011 PA based on Genomics & Society section of latest Strategic Plan, “Charting a 
course for genomic medicine from Base pairs to bedside,” (Nature (2011) 470:205-
213). 
R01 Regular Research Grants 
R03 Small Research Grant, less than 50K each year for two years 
R21 Exploratory, higher risk research, no more than $275K over two years, with no 
more than $200K in a single year 
R25 Education grants 
 
projects. In some cases (e.g., the Environmental Genome Project8), subsequent 
ELSI programs reproduced virtually the same kinds of questions, discourses, and 
communities. Interestingly, in other cases the new versions of the ELSI program 
were pointedly contrasted with the HGP’s ELSI program’s focus on the 
downstream consequences of technological change, (e.g., NSF’s nanotechnology 
initiative9
 
).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8See, for example, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences’ ELSI grantees 
webpage, at http://www.niehs.nih.gov/research/supported/programs/egp/elsi/grantees/index.cfm, 
as of March, 26, 2012. 
9 See, for example, Fisher, Erik. “Lessons learned from the Ethical. Legal and Social Implications 
program (ELSI): planning societal implications research for the National Nanotechnology 
Program.” Technology in Society (2005): 27, 321–328. 
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The ELSI case has been studied and criticized many times and in many 
ways. From the beginning, questions were raised about the capacity of ELSI 
researchers to address the larger, conceptual questions that could potentially 
present fundamental challenges to the HGP. That is, ELSI was a question for the 
HGP, as opposed to the HGP being a question for ELSI. Additionally, the lack of 
critical distance needed to thoughtfully engage with the HGP was noted by a 
number of observes, as, obviously, ELSI insiders would be criticizing the very 
program that paid for their salaries. Furthermore, as Watson’s motivations for 
setting up ELSI were, at best, suspicious and political, the ELSI concept is 
haunted to this day by the notion that it is just window-dressing.  
I will argue, on the other hand, that the driving social forces that have and 
continue to shape ELSI are more profound than the mere lack of critical distance, 
or a political move by a savvy scientist. In my view, a more profound critique of 
ELSI, the one to which my investigation contributes, is the argument that what 
this form of funding has done “is to promote the distressing general tendency to 
divide the project into ‘science’ and the ‘implications’ of that science” (Lindee, 
1994), especially while simultaneously carrying certain normative social and 
ethical commitments from the get go of the technological project. I will point to 
how the NIH expanded the breadth of its claim to technocratic authority by 
claiming that the public need not worry about the societal aspects of genome 
research either. After all, the NIH took on the responsibility to figure this out, and 
it would be guided by the findings of its ELSI experts. But who counts as ELSI 
experts? Who gets to say? And what (who) is left out? 
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3. Fundamental challenges for the HGP: From the philosophy of biology to 
eugenics 
In some ways what is left out of the ELSI agenda was obvious from the 
beginning. While the HGP presented many fundamental challenges and 
shortcomings, especially in light of the grand promises to revolutionize medicine 
made in its name, it was never a question for ELSI to consider whether focusing 
on mapping the human genome was something worth doing in the first place. In 
fact, the first director of the ELSI program, Eric Juengst, told me during an 
interview that that’s basically right; everybody knew that ELSI was not meant to 
ask questions about the worthiness of the HGP endeavor in terms of the 
investment (financial, social, cultural) that was been made in it (Juengst, 2011). 
This would be what I call “fundamentally challenging the HGP”, versus 
predicting problems that the HGP might encounter downstream, hoping to prevent 
these problems so that the HGP can go on more smoothly.  
Themes from which to fundamentally challenge HGP, whether ethically or 
epistemically (or interesting combinations of what it meant for knowledge and 
human self-understanding), are not uncommon. Consider, for instance, what the 
philosopher of biology and bioethicist, Jason Robert, has argued. Robert writes 
that even the realization that it is in the post-genomic era that the real work starts 
– i.e., to transverse between a genome sequence and a complex, functional 
organism, as well as complex determinants of health – is not enough10
                                                 
10 Many have comprehended that the early promises of the HGP are far from being realized – if 
they will ever be able to be fully realized – from simply mapping all nucleotide bases in a given 
. In 
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Robert’s words, “taking development into account is not the same as taking 
development seriously”: 
To take development seriously is not to hide behind 
metaphors of the magical powers of genes – they 
‘instruct’ or ‘program’ the future organism. To take 
development seriously is rather to explore in detail 
the processes and mechanism of differentiation, 
morphogenesis, and growth, and the actual (not 
ideologically or perhaps technologically inflated) 
roles of genes in these organismal activities. Despite 
the existence of what has come to be known as the 
‘interactionist consensus’, according to which 
everyone agrees that both genes and environments 
‘interact’ in the generation of organismal traits, my 
claim is that those swept up in genomania have 
nonetheless failed to take development seriously. 
(Robert, 2004) 
 
 This line of criticism exemplified here by Robert, however, has never 
made into the ELSI program. Placing so much attention and collective hope onto 
the HGP is at the core of Robert’s criticism, as well as that of many other scholars 
who criticize the genetic determinism discourse fundamental to the grandiose 
promises made by the early proponents of the HGP. It is also notable that similar 
criticisms have come after the fact (i.e., the completion of the human genome 
map) from a number of scientists who now point to proteomics11, epigenomics12
 Additionally, in discussing the age of genetic determinism, culminating 
with and perpetuated by the HGP, the bioethicist Inmaculada De Melo-Martin 
, 
etc. 
                                                                                                                                     
human being, let alone an abstract human genome. The discourse along the lines of “the real work 
has just began” is now widely used by the NHGRI. 
11 Like genomics, proteomics refers to large scale, whole-genome study, only in this case of 
proteins (not DNA base pairs), as the main components of metabolic pathways. 
12 Also like genomics, epigenomics refers to a large scale, whole-genome study, only this time 
about the set of epigenetic modifications on the genetic material. 
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underscores the famous point made by the French social theorist Michel Foucault 
in regards to “biopower”, and more broadly to “power”.  By calling into attention 
widely used but nevertheless unrepresentative (e.g., Huntington’s disease) and 
over simplified (e.g., simplified discussions of testing for BRCA1 and 2 mutations 
for breast cancer) cases of genetic diseases to discuss bioethical concepts, De 
Melo-Martin points out how, “bioethicists might inadvertently be promoting 
genetic determinism: the idea that genes alone determine human traits and 
behaviors” (De Melo-Martin, 2005). Here it is important to highlight that not only 
are bioethicists reflecting an institutionally predetermined discourse by focusing 
on these unrepresentative and over simplified cases, it is also true that in order to 
even criticize the perceived problem one has to engage with that discourse; thus, 
in a way, joining the paradigm. Genetic determinism becomes, at least in some 
way, a preoccupation for everyone, whether by worrying about what one’s genes 
have in store for that person, or worrying about the detrimental effects of the 
erroneous notion of genetic determinism. Referring back to Foucault, the debate 
among these different actors, shaped by a particular discourse, forms a field in 
which renegotiations of power and authority are always already constrained. 
 The German sociologist and philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, has also 
considered the advances of genetic and genomic science and technology in 
relation to more fundamental questions of human self-understanding and nature, 
and its impact on our species-ethics13
                                                 
13 See, for example, Habermas’s The Future of Human Nature. 
. Though Habermas was probably not 
interested in applying for ELSI grants (and probably too ineligible for ELSI grant 
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reviewers), the fact that his influential voice picked up on fundamental challenges 
for the HGP is additional evidence that there was indeed an interest in engaging 
the HGP with more upstream based considerations. Though, jokes aside, 
Habermas’ approach and preoccupations were indeed ineligible for ELSI grant 
reviewers not because of the usual density of his writing; but because they were 
out of boundaries for the competencies built into ELSI, thus effectively rendering 
Habermas approach to ethics effectively invisible as far as ELSI goes.  
As with Robert’s critique, criticizing the HGP in terms of the problematic 
implications that the ideology of genetic determinism might have for individuals’ 
wellbeing and for our public policies, as well as the power dynamics created by 
the HGP, are not themes encountered in the abstracts of ELSI funded projects. 
ELSI’s goal was to identify specific, narrow and practical problems, and prevent 
them by developing policy solutions (see Figure 2). Furthermore, it was also not 
part of the ELSI task, in light of these critiques, to attempt to introspect in what 
ways genetic/genomic paradigms are actually useful however imperfect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: An analysis of 141 ELSI 
projects from 2005 - 2010 Fiscal 
Year (proportional to each year), in 
which only the abstract and specific 
aims components of the text were 
taken into consideration, shows that 
nearly half of the grants during this 
time period were awarded to 
projects that included a regulatory 
and/or policy development focus.  
This is a very narrow definition of 
policy. If we take a broad view on 
ELSI research most of it is intended 
to ultimately inform the evolution 
of policy. 
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On the other hand, one line of critique that had the potential to 
fundamentally challenge the HGP, and that indeed received ELSI funding in the 
early years of the program, was the challenge of whether or not the HGP was a 
socially appropriate scientific priority in the context of race, class, genetic 
discrimination, and eugenics. Here two themes can be made distinct: 1) always in 
very narrowly defined and immediate ways, questions of justice and fairness in 
relation to the distribution of the burdens and benefits of the HGP were common 
topics funded by ELSI; and 2) the selection of particular genotypes for future 
generations with renewed anxiety about eugenics. 
 Questions of justice and fairness continue to be discussed by the ELSI 
program. As I write this, for example, the controversy involving the genetic 
testing of the Havasupai tribe by researchers at Arizona State University14 is fresh 
and sparking many ethical assessments by ELSI researchers and bioethicists15
                                                 
14 The Havasupai tribe, who live on the floor of the western Grand Canyon, provided blood 
samples in the early 1990s for what ASU researchers said might help solve the tribe's diabetes 
epidemic. Instead, the samples were used for other research, including attempts to prove that tribal 
ancestors had crossed the frozen Bering Straits into North America. This, the tribe argued, not 
only went against what was agreed by the research subjects who provided the samples, it also 
caused distress in the community who have particular beliefs about the origins of the tribe. 
. As 
I will argue below, questions of justice and fairness are commonly found in the 
HGP’s ELSI literature because ELSI borrows much from professional bioethical 
discourse, and the principle of justice – understood in particular ways – is one of 
the principles of bioethics. Furthermore, addressing questions of justice and 
15 In April of 2011 the congress Exploring the ELSI Universe, of the NHGRI, counted with a 
number of sessions and poster presentations on the Havasupai case. Also, the American Society for 
Bioethics and Humanities 13th Annual meeting, in October 2011, also counted with sessions and 
posters on this case. See, for example, Fullerton, Stephanie M., and Lee, Sandra S-J. “Secondary 
Uses and the Governance of De-identified Data: Lessons from the Human Genome Diversity 
Panel.” BMC Medical Ethics (2011): 16—22. 
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fairness understood in these particular ways does not involve a fundamental 
challenge for the HGP, as the ends of genomic research can be nevertheless 
advanced with technological solutions and/or policy changes to ensure just 
distributions of the burdens and benefits of genomic research and technology. 
 Questions relating to eugenics enjoyed a brief window of ELSI support in 
the early 1990’s. However, what ends up being notable is how these discussions 
made into the ELSI program. That is, the questions here were along the lines of 
“is this eugenics or not?” Most strikingly, the relationship between eugenics and 
genetic/genomic research is an issue thought to have been resolved, at least within 
the context of American bioethics16
A number of influential scientists in the early years of the twentieth 
century (e.g., Julian Huxley) proposed to use knowledge of genetics to free 
humankind from what they called the “genetic load”, i.e., genetic burdens 
accumulating over generations. They argued, furthermore, that improving humans 
over generations (their concern had to do with germline cells that were 
responsible for genetic inheritance) would provide meaning to human existence. 
As Evans shows, scientists’ arguments of providing meaning to human existence 
moved beyond the traditional professional jurisdiction of science (i.e., improving 
human health and wellbeing), entering the professional jurisdiction of theologians 
and philosophers. To defend their jurisdiction from this intrusion of science, 
theologians counter-attacked by engaging scientists in the sorts of substantially 
rational debates common in their profession. The result up to that point was that a 
. 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Buchanan, Alan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler. From 
Chance to Choice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
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wider number of research areas and practices of the scientists was called into 
question now that discussing the ends for humanity was fair game.  Fearing a net 
loss of professional jurisdictional ground, scientists abandoned the idea of giving 
meaning to human existence via genetically “perfecting” the species (Evans, 
2002). 
 However, and Evans fills in the details, scientists were able to come back 
to the business of genetic selection via metaphors of treatment and health – much 
different from discussions of giving meaning to human existence via 
perfectioning the species. Now the selection for or against specific genotypes is 
thought of as a means to the health and wellbeing of future individuals (e.g., pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis). An unequivocal good that is not in need of 
further justification, genetic selection is now very much within the well-
established professional jurisdiction of scientists. Also, the new way to frame 
genetic selection actually promotes the ends of bioethics, such as the advancement 
of beneficence (i.e., genetic selection as therapy and the promotion of individual’s 
health/wellbeing), as well as the end of autonomy (i.e., individual patients have 
new choices). Furthermore, in a context in which patients are imagined as 
rational, autonomous consumers of healthcare, it is up to these individuals to 
make decisions about their future children. All that is left for scientists to do it to 
make sure the process is safe.  
Keeping in mind that much of the historical baggage that eugenics carries 
has to do with the megalomiacal dreams of authoritarian states, the shift to a 
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liberating, individualistic, and health oriented discourse did the trick17. In fact, the 
early 1990’s works of ELSI researchers and bioethicists on this matter concluded 
just that the commonsense notions of eugenics are different in these relevant ways 
from what geneticists are now doing18
 In sum, the kinds of critiques that could fundamentally challenge the HGP 
have been either ignored by the ELSI program, as in the case of misleading and in 
other ways problematic notions of genetic determinism; or they have been 
assimilated and reformulated by the ELSI program so as not to present 
fundamental challenges to the HGP, as in the case of questions of justice and 
fairness in the burdens and benefits of genomic research.  
. Of course this leaves open questions of 
justice, but as I mentioned above, these can be dealt with technological advances 
and policy fixes (e.g., making technologies cheaper and more accessible, and 
implementing policies that regulate the use and distribution of the technologies), 
thus not presenting a fundamental threat to the HGP. 
As a clarification, I should point out that when I argue that the ELSI 
program ignored one line of criticism of the HGP, or incorporated another to the 
extent that it did not fundamentally challenge the HGP, what I have in mind are 
not full blown conspiracies, but more subtle social forces. As I will argue below, 
the ELSI program now transcends the HGP ELSI research of the NIH. “ELSI” has 
come to refer to category of problems that attach to large techno-scientific 
projects, and to a community that self-identifies as “ELSI researchers”. For this 
                                                 
17 See, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, by Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman 
Daniels, and Daniel Wikler. 
18 See, for example, Robert N. Proctor, Genomics and Eugenics: How Fair Is the Comparison? 
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community to exist, it must engage in boundary work by defining the values, 
questions, skills, and discourses shared by its members. Now, keeping in mind 
that ELSI is closely related to bioethics, some of its values are the set ends of (and 
are inherited from) bioethics, i.e., autonomy, non-malfeasance, beneficence, and 
justice. Indeed, many ELSI researchers are also bioethicists. In addition, the ELSI 
program has an added principle, i.e., moving outcomes of genomic research to 
society (though, as ELSI has transcended genomics, genomic research is 
interchangeable with many other areas of research, such as nanotechnology 
research).  
In so far as the shared values, questions, discourses and system of abstract 
knowledge of the ELSI community can lead it to certain places it will go there. 
Likewise, to the extent that these common features shared by ELSI researchers 
cannot lead them to other places they won’t go there. In other words, the 
bioethical competencies that were inscribed into HGP ELSI only answered the 
questions that were visible to it, while a number of other questions were rendered 
invisible because they were out of the boundaries of the competencies for the 
community it produced.  Thus the more substantive preoccupations were placed 
off the limits to critique the HGP and they remained so after ELSI took off as a 
new area/community of research. Much of what is coming below is dedicated to 
understanding what are the sets of values, discourses, intellectual abilities, and 
questions that make up the ELSI community; how they came into being; what 
purpose they serve; and at what costs. 
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4. Common critiques made about ELSI: James Watson’s politics and public 
relations 
As I alluded to above, one of the low-hanging fruits from which to 
criticize ELSI is its colorful creator, the Nobel laureate scientist James Watson. 
One of the co-discovers of the double helix structure of DNA in 1953 – for which 
he won the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine with Francis Crick in 1962 – 
Watson later claimed that the biggest accomplishment of his career was the 
development of the ELSI program (Watson, 2000).   
Watson’s vision for ELSI included questions of applied ethics in the 
conduct and outcomes of the HGP, with expectations that ELSI would develop 
policy options and guidelines to address narrowly defined, downstream concerns. 
He was mainly concerned with questions of privacy, writing that “[w]e need to 
explore the social implications of human genome research and figure out some 
protection for people’s privacy so that these fears do not sabotage the project” 
(Watson, 1992). Additionally, writing together with the Juengst, Watson said, 
“doing the Genome Project in the real world means thinking about social impacts 
from the start, so that science and society can pull together to optimize the 
benefits of this new knowledge for human welfare and opportunity" (Watson and 
Juengst, 1992). Though Watson’s concerns were very narrowly defined, asking 
for nothing more than a policy proposal that could fix the problem, he seemed to 
see an important role for ELSI. However, other times Watson appeared to think of 
the role of ELSI in explicitly cynical terms. He has been quoted as saying, "I 
wanted a group that would talk and talk and never get anything done" (Andrews 
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1999, p. 206). Aware of statements like this, as well as the political background of 
the HGP, a number of observers have voiced the critique that ELSI merely served 
as the public relations branch or political cover for the HGP19
Framing the “problem” of ELSI in terms of mere window-dressing misses 
more important questions. How is it that ethical and social concerns are, in one 
way, reduced to narrowly defined, downstream research components within 
technological projects, while, in another way, these technological endeavors carry 
prior, tacitly inscribed normative commitments to imaginations of social problems 
and solutions?  
. 
ELSI has a rich history of connectedness with other important events in 
American science governance. Its unique structure within scientific institutions 
such as the NIH also offers the possibilities for interesting insights about its role 
in science governance, and its possibilities for the future. The very progression of 
the ELSI research agenda alone shows a noteworthy dynamic between different 
actors, as it was basically carved up through persistent (re)negotiations between 
philosophers, sociologists, law professors, historians, and theologians (who were 
interested in more substantive debates about genomic research), and mainstream 
bioethicists and scientists who became the gatekeepers of ELSI due to prior 
commitments to formal rationality which lent themselves to the in-built constrains 
of ELSI’s scope. Understanding these negotiations in their historical contexts 
powerfully challenges the notion that ELSI merely serves as the public relations 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Fisher, Erik. “Lessons learned from the Ethical. Legal and Social Implications 
program (ELSI): planning societal implications research for the National Nanotechnology 
Program.” Technology in Society (2005): 27, 321–328.  
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Figure 3: The professional association of ELSI researchers: 
LAW =111; ETHICS =65; MEDICINE =65; GENETICS =63; 
PSYCHOLOGY/PSYCHIATRY =56; PHILOSOPHY=51; ANTHROPOLOGY =43; 
SOCIOLOGY =35; POLICY =33;  EPIDEMIOLOGY=30; GENETIC COUNSELING 
=24;  BIOLOGY =23; NURSING =22; PUBLIC HEALTH =21; BEHAVIOR=15; 
EDUCATION =15;  RELIGION/THEOLOGY =15; HISTORY =14; COMMUNICATION 
=12; ECONOMICS =12; PHARMACOLOGY =11; POLITICAL SCIENCE =10; 
HUMANITIES=9;  MOLECULAR BIOLOGY =9; NEUROLOGY/NEUROSCIENCE=9; 
ENGINEERING=7; ONCOLOGY=6; SOCIAL WORK=6; PARKS & RECREATION =4; 
PEDIATRICS =4; SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY STUDIES =4; INFORMATICS & 
COMPUTER SCIENCE =3; LITERATURE =3; PUBLIC AFFAIRS =2; DRAMA =1 
 
Figure 3 shows the sheer diversity of ELSI applicants, and the general distribution. It 
includes information on all PIs of all applications considered for funding in FY 2005-2011. 
If a PI put in multiple applications, they are counted for each application they submitted. 
 
branch of the HGP. Reducing ELSI to window-dressing misses these many points 
ipso facto.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  37 
5. Common critiques made about ELSI, continued: Policy outcomes vs. 
cultural relevance 
By the mid 1990’s ELSI was criticized for being structured in a way that 
facilitated all but the identification of narrowly defined problems with the 
attachment of policy solutions20
After leaving his post as the director of the ELSI program in 1994, Juengst 
wrote about ELSI’s struggle to balance the inclusion of researchers from a 
number of fields, ranging from the humanities to the social and natural sciences. 
The ultimate goal was for ELSI to be an effective agent of change, capable of 
practical accomplishments. In Juengst’s view, the best way for ELSI to be 
effective in its imperative to predict and prevent problems that the HGP might 
encounter was indeed by creating a larger community of committed, expert 
genomics-watchers, who would be multidisciplinary, thus being able to identify a 
broader range of issues the HGP might run in to. On the other hand, critics were 
calling for the creation of more traditional, task-specific commissions, with said 
tasks limited to the identification of problems and the development of policy 
options. The suggested approach was that the NIH leadership would give these 
commissions specific problems/topics to work on (e.g., genetic privacy). This was 
.  According to these critics, ELSI was not narrow 
and applied enough, and it was unable to generate policy options. In regards, for 
example, to one of ELSI’s pointed successes, the extension of the American with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, critics called it ELSI’s one single success.  
                                                 
20 See, for example, Kitcher, Philip. Science, Truth, and Democracy. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
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pointedly contrasted with the larger ELSI research community working on 
identifying the many possible problems the HGP might encounter. 
Ultimately the critics won. The line of criticism that the ELSI structure 
was more suited to stimulate discussion across a wide spectrum of scholars than 
to implement policy decisions trigged, in April of 1996, the appointment of an 
eleven member Committee to Evaluate the ELSI Program of the HGP. The 
committee issued its final report in December of that year. It concluded that the 
charge of the ELSI program was so broad and complex that it was confusing to its 
various participants and observers. This confusion led to uncertainty about ELSI’s 
primary functions, meaning that appropriate public and professional interactions 
in health policy development could not be achieved under the current structure. 
From these conclusions, the evaluation committee proceeded to make a number of 
recommendations, including the creation of the ELSI Research, Planning, and 
Evaluation Group (ERPEG), which would be able to evaluate ELSI in real time. 
In 1997 the National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research 
(NACHGR) endorsed these recommendations, and the ERPEG was established in 
July of that year. The report was seen as an important, redefining moment for 
ELSI. It initially caused a shift in the agenda making process for ELSI, with a 
more top-down approach –the agenda being determined by the leadership of the 
HGP and ELSI within the NIH and the DOE. This was clearly contrasted with the 
set of negotiations that took place between these more clinically and policy-
oriented directors of the HGP and professional bioethicists in the leadership of the 
ELSI program, with the scholars who were considered to be politically 
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appropriate to be included as non professional bioethicist participants in the early 
agenda setting conferences for ELSI. 
The ERPEG, which was chaired by bioethicist and then director of the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, LeRoy Walters, effectively 
took on the role of arbiter in regards to the ELSI agenda and structure, drawing 
authority from its given mission to provide ELSI with expert guidance on matters 
relating to its extramural research portfolios. Specifically, the ERPEG provided 
expertise on current and future research methods or approaches for studying ELSI 
issues, suggesting new topics, issues, and priorities, providing input on the use of 
funding mechanisms, and proposing methods for obtaining input from the public, 
scientific and other communities about research priorities. Finally, these were 
coupled with including ways of disseminating information back to these 
communities.  
Undoubtedly, the critique that the ELSI format was not suited for the 
development of policy options was heard by the NIH, as it triggered major 
changes in the ELSI program. Nevertheless, this line of criticism was so clearly 
pointed at a particular outcome that it also missed on many important and more 
profound points about ELSI and its relation to science governance. Again, the 
questions persist: who gets to say who counts as an ELSI expert? Who gets to say 
what counts as the role of ELSI? Why? And what (who) is left out? 
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6. Substantive rationality in double jeopardy: Bottlenecking the ELSI agenda 
Let’s now consider some possible explanations, or genealogies, for the shape 
that the ELSI program took, and what the consequences of taking these routes are. 
Some of the earlier calls for projects by the ELSI program (as early as 1989)  
involved agenda-setting conferences, workshops, and speaker series21. This 
included a mix of scholars from different fields with a broad overview of the 
issues at hand (Juengst, 2011). The 1992 edited volume, The Code of Codes: 
Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project, was a direct product 
of those early years of speaker series and agenda setting seminars.  It documents a 
rich agenda for ELSI. In it one finds materials diverse in both subject and scope. 
It included pieces on the integration of new genetic tests into medical practice, 
training, counseling and education, and accessibility of genetic tests by third 
parties, as well as a number of pieces on the historical22 and conceptual23 origins 
of the HGP, and critiques of the HGP’s conceptual approach24
Yet in 1991, following these early-stage activities and even before The 
Code of Codes had been published, Juengst produced the first document setting 
the agenda for ELSI. He identified three areas of interest for ELSI projects: 1) 
issues involving the integration of new genetic tests into medical practice; 2) 
issues involving education and counseling of individuals about genetic tests; and 
. 
                                                 
21 E.g., California Institute of Technology, 1989-1990 academic year 
22 Daniel J. Kelves. Out of Eugenics: The Historical Politics of the Human Genome 
23 Horace Freeland Judson. A History of the Science and Technology Behind Gene Mapping and 
Sequencing  
24 Evelyn Fox Keller. Nature, Nurture, and the Human Genome Project 
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3) issues of access to, and use of, genetic test results by third parties, including 
insurance providers, researchers and employers (Juengst, 1991).  
Contrasting Juengst’s agenda with The Code of Codes shows a 
disconnection between the official agenda of the ELSI program (the former) with 
a direct product of the early agenda setting years of ELSI (the latter): the absence 
of the historical and conceptual critiques of the HGP project.  
To understand this disconnect between two different pieces basically 
addressing the same agenda setting period, one has to place this situation in the 
context of human genetic engineering discussions pre-dating the HGP.  As Evans 
documents, it was not only out of moral scandals in scientific research, such as 
Tuskegee, that the field of bioethics became a new locus of ethical deliberation on 
science and medicine. Preoccupations about basic scientific research also 
profoundly contributed to the professional development of bioethics. Among 
these, the area of genetic engineering stirred strong responses from the public and 
scholars from the field of theology. It was justly in response to worries about 
genetic engineering that much of the bioethics profession was consolidated, with 
its forms of discourse and ethical deliberation becoming the norm for engaging in 
ethical discussions about the life sciences. Evans cites Juengst as one of the most 
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influential25 authors in the rationalization/thinning of bioethics, and even as 
giving it an explicit theorization26
For Juengst, the debate during the 1960s and 1970s 
on germline Human Genetic Engineering, as 
conducted by such substantively rational authors as 
Paul Ramsey and Joseph Fletcher, was “primitive”. 
[…] While other topics discussed during the 1960s 
and 1970s, such as organ transplantation and 
psychosurgery, have “been assimilated quite 
productively into bioethics, evolution toward 
clinical ethics and health policy, the subject of 
human germ-line engineering resists civilization.” 
[…] Juengst points out that “it is difficult to 
translate this literature into practical policies for 
scientific research beyond the cautionary moratoria 
it has already inspired.” (Evans, 2002).  
. As Evans puts it: 
 
Using the writings of Juengst, Evans illustrates the process of 
consolidation of the professional field of bioethics, which involved consensus on 
certain forms of inquiry and discourse. That is, moving ethical deliberation on the 
life sciences to the stages of “precision” and “generalization”, which was possible 
by the acceptance of the principles of autonomy, non-malfeasance, beneficence, 
and justice as the ends to be pursued in scientific research and bioethics.  My 
argument about the agenda announcement for the beginning of the ELSI program 
is based on this context of “precision” and “generalization” having the principles 
of bioethics as the foundation. And my argument is very much facilitated by the 
fact that Juengst himself was the director of the ELSI program at the time – a 
                                                 
25 Evans’ citation analysis in Playing God shows that Eric Juengst was one of the most often cited 
bioethicists in the early 1990’s. See Figure 5: Clustering of most influential authors, 1992-1995. 
Pg. 156. 
26 Juengst makes and analogy with the development of the professional field of bioethics over time 
by using Alfred North Whitehead’s concept of the three stages of inquiry: romantic, precision, and 
generalizing. 
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position of influence, to say the least, in defining the agenda for ELSI27
Sharing the consensus on the professional ends and discourses of bioethics 
(i.e., clinical and policy orientation, and based on the principles of bioethics), 
Juengst naturally tried to shape the ethical and social debates on the HGP in that 
direction. Hence what was outside of this scope did not make the cut into ELSI’s 
agenda. Additionally, as I will argue below, ELSI is in an exceptional position to 
house formally rational debates.  This is because ELSI is situated in the clinically 
oriented NIH, and, as a formal research program, it has a system of accountability 
and predefined goals that give gate keeping authority to a handful of specific 
. In other 
words, via the formalization of the rational discourses on bioethics in general, and 
the figure of Juengst in particular as director of the new ELSI program, bioethics 
became the foundation for ELSI, with ELSI crystallizing and formalizing these 
debates as subsidiary to the technological project itself. 
                                                 
27 Though it did not have to be Juengst. The point is that once bioethics becomes a profession that 
is boxed-in by shared values and modes of discourse, any other bioethicist at the time, almost by 
definition, would probably have acted in the same way Juengst did. 
Fig. 4: Same sample as Fig 1. 
Nearly half of the grants during this time 
period were awarded to applications that 
included 2 or more methods (“Multiple 
Methods” in Green).  A third of the 
grants went to applications that used 
qualitative methods only or quantitative 
methods only.  Nearly a fifth of grants 
went to applications that used conceptual 
methods only or legal methods only.   
The “other” category includes things like 
online bioethics and medical genetics 
databases and resources. 
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individuals. Finally, as I explored above, discussions relating the HGP to 
eugenics, a relatively common subject of inquiry in the early days of ELSI, were 
addressed and resolved within the ELSI program and bioethics in the context of 
formal rationality, through advancing autonomy and beneficence, and without 
having negative implications along the lines of malfeasance and injustice. This 
explanation for the bottleneck process of the early ELSI research agenda is one 
level in which one can understand the ELSI program in the context of the NIH 
and professional/disciplinary bioethics.  
As an institutional structure, ELSI produced forms of “bottlenecking” in 
agenda setting moments, where the range of possible questions was defined in 
advance by the historical events that shaped the field of bioethics. The 
proliferation of new concerns and forms of argumentation was always already 
constrained by these prior commitments which were built into the disciplinary 
structures of the enterprise itself, via accountability measures, grant review, merit 
criteria, policy-relevance, appointment of influential bioethicists to leadership 
positions, etc. 
As is to be expected, ELSI’s agenda has been revisited a number of times 
since its first announcement in 1991. What is notable, however, is that these 
subsequent revisions, such as a piece that Juengst published for the ELSI agenda 
in 1993, stresses just the same kinds of concerns from the previous agenda, 
showing that ELSI was untouched by the more substantive interests that surfaced 
in the agenda setting moments a few years before. The points Juengst indentified 
for the new agenda were virtually the same as the previous agenda: 1) helping 
  45 
genetics services providers develop guide-ines for the introduction of genetic tests 
into clinical practice; 2) recognize the very personal nature of genetic information 
and taking steps to ensure its privacy and confidentiality; 3) identifying policy 
options to ensure the fair use of genetic information by parties outside of the 
clinical context, such as employers and insurers; and 4) improving professional 
and public education in the area of genetics and its implications for society 
(Juengst, 1993). 
 Just as the institutional position of ELSI remained the same, the larger 
community of science studies scholars also remained true to their more 
substantive interests. Similar to the preceding events of the previous 
announcement, a number of conferences took place yet again to discuss the 
agenda for ELSI going in to the future. As a result of these conferences some new 
edited volumes were published shortly thereafter, they were: Gene Mapping 
(1992); Justice and the Human Genome Project (1994); Genes and Human Self 
Knowledge (1994). 
 In Gene Mapping, which was a result of the January, 1991, extramural 
workshop in Bethesda, Maryland, a forward by Watson and Juengst is included; it 
reads: “the goal [of ELSI] is to be in a position by FY 1995 to complement the 
completion of the genetic reference map of the human genome with a slate of 
policy options addressing the highest priority challenges the uses of that map will 
pose” (Watson and Juengst, 1995). However, similar to The Code of Codes, Gene 
Mapping also counts with a considerable number of articles on the history of 
genetic and genomic research, as well as broad philosophical issues raised by the 
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HGP, such as reductionism and determinism, and the complexity of the 
determinants of health and disease and its implications for gene therapy. The 
volume counts with contributors such as the historians of science Judith Swazey 
and Robert Proctor, and the historian and philosopher of science and bioethicist 
Arthur Caplan – whose piece is titled, If Gene Therapy Is the Cure, What Is the 
Disease? 
Similarly, Justice and the Human Genome Project is a collection of essays 
presented in an extramural conference held in late 1991 in Chicago. This book is 
certainly more in line with addressing narrowly defined problems the HGP is 
likely to encounter downstream. There is a small overlap of contributors between 
this volume and Gene Mapping (e.g., George Annas and Arthur Caplan write on 
both) and notably one piece, Justice and the Limitation of Genetic Knowledge28
                                                 
28 Marc A. Lappe (1994). 
, 
scrutinizes the value of paradigms of genomic research. Genes and Human Self-
Knowledge, on the other hand, is a collection of essays presented in the 1992 
University of Iowa’s Humanities Symposium which counted with scholars from 
history, philosophy, religious studies, among other disciplines – some of the 
specific contributors were the philosophers Evan Fales and Michael Ruse, who 
raised ontological and epistemological questions about genetic and genomic 
research, and the philosopher and bioethicist Dan Brock. In opposition to Justice 
and the Human Genome Project, Genes and Human Self-Knowledge addresses 
much broader philosophical and historical issues facing the HGP, providing little 
immediate policy relevance.  
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One way in which volumes like these are especially interesting is in 
regards to how they complicate Evans’s big picture framework for understanding 
the development of bioethics.  Here it is important to remember that while 
Evans’s theory does much to help provide a clear and concise understanding of 
bioethics and ELSI, the actual dynamic on the ground is messier and more 
complicated. The evidence contained in these edited volumes offers further 
insight into the particular institutional spaces in which ELSI was molded, 
including challenges, negotiations, and re-negotiations between different 
stakeholders. But certainly while bioethicists and assorted others will challenge 
what other bioethicists say, I agree that over time boundary work will be 
accomplished, with specific values and modes of discourse and investigation 
predominating the field. Thus, more detailed accounts of the specific dynamics 
that happened in the making of the ELSI program builds on, thus comporting 
with, Evans’s framework. What is notable from this evidence for the 
bottlenecking process which produced the ELSI agenda announcements is that the 
more formalized and tangible ways in which ELSI is structured acts as a powerful 
catalyst for the consolidation of certain values and modes of discourse and 
investigation when compared to the more loosely defined professional field of 
bioethics. 
At the same time that ELSI, as a proper locus for ethical and social 
preoccupations in the HGP, can be seen as a catalyst for the consolidation of the 
characteristics of bioethics, it must be the case that the earlier normative work in 
bioethics (e.g., on human genetic engineering, the definition of autonomy, 
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beneficence, non-malfeasance, and justice) was inscribed into ELSI. With this in 
mind, those who were boxed-out of bioethics in the earlier ethical and social 
discussions in the life sciences experienced a sort of ‘double jeopardy’ when it 
came to ELSI; that is, in virtue of particular values and modes of discourse and 
deliberation having become predominant in bioethics, bioethicists like Eric 
Juengst became the gatekeepers of ELSI research. As a result, those who were 
boxed-out of ethical and social discussions in the life sciences, or otherwise were 
interested in more substantive debates, had a still harder time having their voices 
heard in the context of ELSI, as ELSI was more tightly controlled and more 
narrowly defined than bioethics by virtue of its structure as a formal research 
program, with funding criteria, mandate accountability structures, etc. Despite of 
the fact that some individuals outside of bioethics did participate in the early 
agenda setting conferences for ELSI research – because, in the words of Juengst, 
they were the “usual suspects to be invited to these conferences” (Juengst, 2011) – 
their interests did not make the final cut into the subsequent official 
announcements for the ELSI research agenda.  
Boxing out certain interests and approaches to social and ethical questions 
about science and technology had obvious impacts on ELSI’s allocation of 
resources. But more importantly, and also contributing to resource allocation, it 
had impacts on the (de)legitimization of certain questions, approaches and 
methods in social and ethical research on science and technology. As a public 
project, ELSI is, in a sense, a barer of the public interest. And its control of public 
resources is itself a reflection of a prioritization/agenda setting authority.  
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The victory of formally rational modes of discourse produced the 
discipline of bioethics. Since to the victor belongs the spoils, formally rational 
bioethicists were in a position to become the gatekeepers of ELSI. However, since 
many of the more substantively rational authors were still around during the 
formative years for ELSI – justly because the professional jurisdictional forces 
that shaped bioethics were not conspiracies but social processes – it was deemed 
politically appropriate to include non-professional-bioethicist participants in the 
early agenda setting conferences for ELSI.  As Juegnst put it, they were “the usual 
suspects”. But when the time came to actually put pen on paper for what the ELSI 
agenda would look like, those holding the pen (e.g., Juegnst) naturally shifted the 
discourse towards formal rationality.  
But, as I will argue in the last section of this paper, besides supporting 
Evans’s theorization of the development of bioethics, this account of ELSI also 
illuminates a larger question regarding of why many social problems are imagined 
in terms of technological imperatives. 
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7. Progressing with the ELSI program: The victory of formal rationality  
One curious observation about the critique of ELSI contained in this work 
in comparison with critiques of ELSI by a number of other authors is the 
following: While I am coming from the perspective that technological projects 
like the HGP carry tacitly inscribed but rather powerful technological 
imaginations of what constitutes social problems and solutions, ELSI’s focus on 
rather narrowly defined, downstream problems for the HGP (with a policy 
mandate). On the other hand, a number of authors have voiced just the concern 
that the way in which ELSI is structured facilitates all but the identification of 
narrowly defined problems with the attachment of specific policy solutions29
 The line of critique that the “ELSI's grant structure was more suited to 
stimulate discussion across a wide spectrum of scholars than to implement policy 
decisions” (Wolfe, 2000), however different from my critique at first glance, is 
also accurate in some ways. Furthermore, however narrow it is, it points to an 
interesting fact. Given the predefined ELSI framework, ELSI was able to engage 
. As I 
have noted, one of ELSI’s pointed successes, the extension of the American with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, has been called by critics ELSI’s single success (though 
this was mostly before the passing of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act  (GINA) of 2008, also credited to the ELSI program). 
                                                 
29 See, for example, P. Kitcher, Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, New 
York (2001), and/or L. McCain, A policy appraisal of the US human genome project, University 
of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder (2003), Chapter 6. 
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Fig. 5: List of ELSI planning moments and evaluation reports: 
 1990:  ELSI Working Group (Wexler) 
 1995:  Joint NIH/DOE Committee to Evaluate the ELSI Program 
(Spence/Rothstein) 
 1996:  Review of ELSI 1990-1995 (Thomson) 
 2000: NIH and DOE ELSI Research Planning and Evaluation Group Final 
Report (Walters) 
 2003:  ERA/EPPG Planning Report (Burke) 
 2005:  ERA Report to Council (Burke/Juengst) 
 2008:  ELSI Assessment Panel (Shapiro) 
 
with and respond to certain critiques but not others. At this point, I turn back to 
EPERG group put together to evaluate the ELSI program from 1997 onward. 
 As we have seen, the eleven-member EPERG ELSI-watchdog was 
appointed by the ELSI evaluative committee in response to criticisms that the 
ELSI charge was so broad and complex as to be confusing to various participants 
and observers. Similar planning moments and evaluation reports also attempted to 
keep the ELSI mandate quite narrowly defined (see Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mission of the ERPEG, chaired by LeRoy Waters, was to provide 
ELSI with expert guidance on matters relating to its extramural research 
portfolios, and expertise on current and future research methods or approaches for 
studying ELSI issues. The choice of Waters - coming from the birthplace of 
traditional American bioethics, Georgetown University, and with a longstanding 
role in public bioethics - for chair of the ERPEG once again highlights just the 
kinds of leadership positions that traditional bioethicists were able to get after the 
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triumph of formal rationality in the field.30
The criticism of ELSI’s inefficient format could resonate with the ELSI 
leadership because it was made within the boundaries of formal rationality. In 
fact, it was meant to be assimilated quite productively as a step towards clinical 
ethics and health policy. In a context where many critics are questioning the value 
of formal rationality and the downstream orientation of ELSI, the criticism that 
ELSI was not constrained enough as to be able to generate policy options begged 
the question. 
 But going back to the common critique 
that ELSI was poorly equipped to identify and address narrowly defined 
downstream problems, this was picked up as a valid critique because it was made 
in the same terms used in the system of abstract knowledge of bioethics. 
Ironically powered by this lack-of-tangible-outcomes criticism, the 
institutional response was to implement even more concrete ways to control for 
ELSI’s narrowly defined and policy oriented mandate.  
This is especially interesting because this is a manifestation of a way in 
which the ELSI program was in a better position than the field of bioethics to 
advance the very original project of bioethics. Because of its formal structure as a 
research program, the ELSI program can more easily select what criticisms it will 
respond to, and then respond to them. Bioethics, for being more loosely defined, 
does not have the capability of forming a centralized, top-down plan for its future. 
As I will discuss in the next section, this difference between ELSI and bioethics 
                                                 
30 Evans documents that LeRoy Waters, like Eric Juengst, is one of the proponents of formal 
rationality in bioethics, including the use of the so called principles of bioethics.  
  53 
will probably lead to the selection of ELSI as the default system of governance in 
science and technology. 
Additionally, in the case of ELSI, different forces from, but not at odds 
with (and indeed complementary with), those that drove the development of the 
bioethics profession, gave ELSI a life of its own.  The ELSI program which 
originated as a specific research program with the HGP has already been selected 
for becoming more than a specific research endeavor. ELSI has become a 
research concept that is applied in many other scientific endeavors (e.g., NSF’s 
nanotechnology initiative, the Environmental Genome Project, and more).  
While bioethics is under the influence of the subtle, abstract, and soft 
forces of professionalization, ELSI counts with formal means of control. Though 
this may seem like an obvious observation at first, it was due to this fact that ELSI 
was selected for transcending the HGP, and now it is present in other 
technological projects, thus creating a community of researchers who identify 
themselves as ELSI researchers31
Though ELSI and bioethics share a lot of the same commitments to formal 
rationality and principles to be advanced, the differences in structure are 
significant enough that it is productive to examine not only how they are similar, 
but also how they are different, and what these differences might have in store for 
them. 
. In other words, the formal characteristics of 
ELSI caused it to be selected for and a catalyst of a quasi-professional field to 
advance certain institutionally authorized questions in science and technology. 
                                                 
31 For example, in April of 2011 I was in a meeting called, Exploring the ELSI Universe, in which 
there was a strong sense of shared questions and discourses among the participants. 
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8. Bioethics and partisan politics: What ELSI can do that bioethics cannot 
One of the topics discussed in the American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities (ASBH) 13th annual meeting, in October of 2011 in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, was the infiltration of partisan politics in the field of bioethics. This 
topic yielded a few sessions in the meeting, including a plenary session with the 
keynote speakers Jonathan Moreno and John Arras, both senior level bioethicists. 
Moreno has recently published a book, The Body Politic: The Battle Over Science 
in America, which, among other things, addresses this topic. 
The palpable consensus formed during the ASBH meeting was that, 
despite its certainly political beginnings, bioethics used to be a locus of normative 
considerations in the biosciences that was marked by the characteristic cordiality 
of academia, in which people with different ideologies were free to disagree, but 
it was nothing personal at the end of the day. In an almost melancholic tone, a 
large group of sexagenarian bioethicists (though I suspect that I am being 
generous in estimating their ages) spent a couple of hours thinking about, in the 
words of a member of the audience, “what went wrong with bioethics.” Examples 
given of what has gone wrong with bioethics included partisan bioethics groups 
that would not attend each other’s meetings and that would publish inflammatory 
papers. Part of the session was also dedicated to discussing how bioethics would 
proceed into the future, now that it found itself in the mix of this hyper-polarized 
political landscape. 
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The question of how bioethics will proceed into the future now that 
vicious, partisan politics has found its way in the field is especially interesting to 
me in light of what I have identified as the characteristics of the ELSI program.  
Though remembered in very warm ways by the ASBH attendees, the good 
old days of bioethics, free from partisan politics, can be explained by the 
acceptance of formal rationality as the modus operandi of bioethics. In tacit ways, 
substantively rational authors, many of whom were conservative thinkers such as 
Leon Kass32
As the present political moment makes clear, the United States has 
become, for reasons that are better left aside, particularly socially and politically 
divided than in previous moments in recent American history. Now, because 
bioethics is a locus of deliberation of complicated moral issues, and because its 
professional boundaries are somewhat porous (many people can label themselves 
as bioethicists), it is only to be expected that political battles would enter the 
, were boxed out of bioethics proper, because their questions and 
answers about the life sciences simply did not make sense in the context of the 
thinned discourse of bioethics. These tacit but powerful forces may have shifted 
bioethical discussions one way along the political spectrum, while simultaneously 
avoiding more explicitly heated confrontations. That is, overt politics were 
excluded by rationalizing out the discursive conflicts that would have made the 
political cleavages visible. 
                                                 
32 It is noteworthy that Leon Kass, who headed a national bioethics body for 5 years, and who is 
arguably one of the most famous bioethicists in the country, can still be considered an 
“outsider/not-mainstream” bioethicist. This highlights the power of the system of abstract 
knowledge (i.e. formal rationality) of the field. 
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bioethics arena. In this sense, bioethics risks losing the formal rationality 
characteristics that were the basis of its jurisdictional authority in the past and that 
made it possible to do what it does – i.e., to apply pre-determined ethical 
principles (such as autonomy, non-malfeasance, beneficence, and justice) to 
morally contentious issues. 
Again, to the extent that partisan politics is infiltrating, or arguably being 
uncovered, in the context of bioethical bodies, this field seems to be losing some 
of the characteristics that have allowed it to successfully define and rule some of 
the normative dimensions of the life sciences. ELSI, however, is in a more secure 
position to do this work. In the ways I have described above (i.e., being formally 
boxed in governmental agencies, with a number of concrete gate keepers), ELSI 
becomes a locus of investigating science and technology via formal rationality 
and by applying the pre-determined principles of bioethics. Because the questions 
addressed by ELSI can be more easily determined by the single stroke of a pen, 
and because membership to the ELSI community can be better controlled by ELSI 
grants, the social forces that mold these professional fields have a smaller risk of 
being overmatched by other forces such as partisan political ideology. Recent 
developments in ELSI, such as the creation of the Centers for Excellence in ELSI 
Research (CEERs) add even more levels of circumscription of the ELSI 
community33
                                                 
33 To date, six CEERs have been installed: at the University of Washington, Center for Genomics 
and Health Care Equality; Stanford University School of Medicine, Center for Integration of 
Research on Genetics and Ethics; The Duke Center for the Study of Public Genomics; Case 
Western Reserve University, Center for Genetic Research Ethics and Law; Center for Genomics 
. 
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However, since ELSI directly counts on Congressional authorization I 
suppose that the argument can be made that ELSI is more, not less, subject to 
partisan politics than bioethics. But here two points should be made, which I 
believe make this argument short lived. One, this characteristic of ELSI, that it 
counts on political authorization (from Congress) is similar to some of the spaces 
of bioethics, such as Presidential commissions since they are, in ways, depended 
on Presidential authorization (i.e., the President forms the commission). So, 
political authorization is something that both ELSI and at least the President’s 
Commission on bioethics have in common. If anything, the President’s 
Commission would be more vulnerable to partisan politics than ELSI research 
programs because, in so far as the President’s Commission is linked to the given 
president of the time, the President’s Commission is more likely to be 
significantly changed with new parties coming into the White House. ELSI, on 
the other hand, is linked to Congress in more indirect ways than the President’s 
Commission is to the President. For ELSI, there are many layers of authorization 
and bureaucracy between itself and Congress, thus diluting overt partisan issues to 
the point that they are virtually not present in ELSI grant announcements.  
But, of course, the President’s Commission is only one of the many spaces 
of bioethics. Some additional spaces that are not formally linked to any 
governmental body are places like research institutes (e.g., The Hastings Center, 
the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, etc.) and professional societies (e.g., ASBH). 
                                                                                                                                     
and Society at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; and the University of Pennsylvania, 
Center for the Integration of Genetic Healthcare Technology.  
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However, and as it was discussed in the ASBH meeting in 2011, it is out of 
political agendas that many new research institutes and professional societies 
come into being. With this in mind, the lack of a formal link with governmental 
branches, departments, or agencies does not mean the lack of political motivation.  
If anything, just the opposite may be true in some cases.  
The institutional structures in which ELSI is set up, combined with the 
early influence of bioethics into the formation of ELSI’s intellectual 
commitments, make it such that ELSI is better equipped than bioethics to advance 
the principles of bioethics in the context of formal rationality. With this in mind, I 
believe that, over time, bioethics will become a locus of more popular and 
substantively rational debates in the life sciences, while ELSI will go on to do the 
work that the field of bioethics was originally designed to do. 
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9. Contributing to the thinning of the public debate 
The development of loci of governance in science and technology that 
primarily use formally rational means of discourse (e.g., ELSI and bioethics) is at 
the same time symptomatic of and explains why it is the case that social problems 
and solutions in modern societies tend to be imagined in the context of 
technological challenges.  
The lack of engagement in substantive rationality – which effectively 
debates what a good society would look like, as opposed to what are the best 
means for getting to a preconceived notion of the good – does nothing to facilitate 
the rise of alternative imaginations of how social problems and potential solutions 
are imagined; in anything, alternative imaginations are discouraged by the 
acceptance of formal rationality as the legitimate mode of discourse and 
authorized set of questions. Though this does not identify the roots of 
imaginations of social concerns as technological challenges – something that has 
maintained social theorists occupied for a long time – it is important to note that 
these governance structures that are supposed to be concerned with social and 
ethical problems incentivize the thinning of social and ethical debates. This 
advances imaginations of problems as technological challenges by given-in-
advance boundaries between authorized and unauthorized questions, as well as 
the research communities to deal with these questions. With this in mind, 
something that both ELSI and bioethics cannot accomplish is justly to challenge 
these powerful sociotechnical imaginaries. That, I think, is better left to more 
substantively rational fields, which are also preoccupied with identifying and 
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bringing into critical view these problems in the first place, such as science and 
technology studies, and biology and society.  
A number of observers consider the RAC, and especially the Asilomar 
meeting of 1975, as a great achievement for the ways in which regulatory 
restraints allow science to express itself via the market and produce public 
goods34
Surely it is not the case that regulation à la Asilomar is really only 
constrained to technical risk assessment. That would be impossible because the 
risk assessment is not happening in a vacuum. Dividing science and technology in 
terms of risk assessment and its conformity to social goals is just too artificial, for 
the technology itself, as well as what is understood as risk, are themselves part of 
social goals.  
. This is the case because such regulatory restraints are reduced to 
technical risk assessment, leaving all other aspects of the technology (e.g., social 
goals, human self-understanding, and cultural values) to be sorted out after the 
fact in the free market. In other words, the market is expected to mediate between 
technologies and their social meaning. Here a couple of points should be made 
about this general approach to science and technology governance, and about how 
the specific case of how ELSI fits (or fails to fit) into this picture.  
Publics are often deemed in some way incapable of “productively” 
engaging with the situation, either because they are deemed to be ignorant, 
unscientific, ideological, religiously motivated, etc. This was indeed the case with 
the recombinant DNA technologies and more broadly genetic engineering 
                                                 
34 See, for example, Sharp et al. 2004. 
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controversies of the 1970’s. Public criticism in terms of the unnatural aspects of 
these genetic technologies, or for that matter of the scientists position to “play 
God”, were considered to be non-sense, primitive, and incapable of being 
assimilated productively into bioethics and health policy. When taken at face-
value, criticisms put in these terms (i.e., “playing God”) might indeed sound 
unreasonable. But if these analogies carry deeper meaning to them, it would not 
be clear that they are unreasonable after all. Whichever is the case, those who find 
themselves in a position to regulate science and technology end up dictating their 
social meaning regardless of how minimalistic or conservative their positions are.  
The case of development of the professional field of bioethics is a great 
example of this. In “having” to fill in the position of arbiters of scientific research, 
bioethicists had to judge research in some terms. Facing the difficult situation of 
“having” to judge for a public, while at the same time not having the 
democratically given authority to do so, bioethicists had to make the most 
minimal/conservative judgments possible. These were in terms of the bioethical 
principles that were argued to be universal and not controversial. This approach is 
in a sense a form of risk assessment in terms of harm to individuals’ autonomies, 
health and wellbeing, and a predefined sense of justice. The rest will be sorted out 
in the market. What is failed to be considered is that these scientific investigations 
and technologies are already a response to social problems understood in 
particular ways. By governing these things simply in terms of risk assessments, 
governance structures legitimize the scientific/technological approach to social 
problems, especially when they are deemed safe (i.e., from a narrowly defined 
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risk-assessment perspective). The problem is not the legitimization of this 
understanding of social problems as such. It might indeed be the case that this is 
the most productive way to go about it. The problem, as I see it, is the lack of 
robust justification, debate, and public engagement in arriving at this conclusion. 
ELSI, as a structure of governance like bioethics, furthers this thinning of 
the social debate in a number of ways. Most obviously, it is inscribed with a lot of 
the values, mechanisms, and methods of bioethics. Additionally, ELSI attempts to 
ask more questions than just about autonomy, beneficence, malfeasance and 
justice. But, counter intuitively, in doing so it promotes the thinning of the public 
engagement even more because it effectively sends out the message that the 
public need not worry about the ethical, legal and social implications of research 
because these have already been addressed by ELSI. In other words, ELSI is 
effectively an expansion of the power or jurisdiction of a particular approach to 
science governance. 
 It is up to us, literally thinkers about science and society, not to serve as 
experts to those in power who define the problem. We should redefine and 
question the problems themselves. Is this the right perception of the problem? Is 
this really the problem? Who gets to say? And what is been left out? We should 
ask much more fundamental questions. I think that the real task in a society such 
as ours is to criticize the workings of institutions that appear to be both neutral 
and independent; to criticize and challenge them in such a manner that the 
political violence which has been exercised obscurely through them will be 
unmasked and made vulnerable. 
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